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THE CONSTITUTION AS MIRROR: TRIBE'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 
Richard A. Posner* 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES. By Laurence H. Tribe. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 458. $29.95. 
This book of essays (some previously published) by a leading pro-
fessor and practitioner of constitutional law argues, in effect and often 
in words close to these, that the Constitution is what we want it to be 
(hence "choices") and that what we should want it to be is the charter 
of a radically egalitarian society. Professor Tribe acknowledges the 
conventional constraints on judges' molding the Constitution to their 
personal preferences, but none of those constraints (text, structure, 
history, tradition, precedent) hampers him much. He makes the Con-
stitution the mirror of his political preferences and criticizes the cur-
rent Supreme Court for having sought to conceal its own political 
preferences behind a facade of formalistic reasoning and thus for being 
hypocritical and uncandid. I shall consider the method by which 
Tribe attempts to establish his criticism and his own effort to fill the 
chasm that appears if the criticism is accepted and constitutional deci-
sions are judged purely on political grounds. 
I 
The book has three parts. The first, "The Nature of the Enter-
prise," explains the author's method, which turns out to be the con-
scious rejection of method. The brief first chapter sets the tone by 
renouncing the quest for postulates or principles of constitutional "in-
terpretation." Text, history, structure, philosophy, and political the-
ory (as distinct from raw political preferences) are all rejected because 
"contingency pervades all" (p. 8). Although Tribe says that "constitu-
tional interpretation is a practice alive with choice but laden with con-
tent" (p. 4), and that the Constitution is not "infinitely malleable" 
(id.), in his hands it is almost that; he recognizes few limits on 
"interpretation." · ' 
Chapter Two continues the theme of the first chapter with an at-
tack on John Hart Ely's view that virtually all we need bother about in 
• Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chi-
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reading the Constitution is what Ely regards as its latent goal of mak-
ing the popular branches of government, the legislative and executive 
branches, more representative of the full range of outlooks and inter-
ests in society.1 Although Tribe attacks Ely for neglecting the sub-
stantive policies in the Constitution, the force of the attack is blunted 
by Tribe's implicit belief that those policies do not really originate in 
the Constitution but are put there by the observer, the "chooser." 
Chapter Three of Tribe's book takes up the matter of amending the 
Constitution. This may seem unrelated to interpreting the existing 
Constitution, but amending and construing are much the same thing 
to Tribe. Both are arenas of "constitutional choice," and, for him, 
choices of the same character. Thus he advances the startling proposi-
tion, one consistent with his view of the Constitution's plasticity but 
without basis in the language or history of the Constitution, that an 
amendment might be unconstitutional merely because of a lack of "fit" 
with the existing Constitution. "An amendment prohibiting atheists 
from holding federal office, for example, would clash with the current 
Constitution's paramount concern for freedom of conscience no less 
than a statute to the same effect would run counter to the current 
Establishment Clause."2 Tribe rightly adds, however, that the courts 
should not pass on the constitutionality of amendments, as that 
"would unequivocally subordinate the amendment process to the legal 
system it is intended to override and would thus gravely threaten the 
integrity of the entire structure'~ (p." 27). 
This part of the book ends with a chapter on how courts should 
treat omissions in constitutional and statutory enactments. The chap-
ter contains an interesting discussion of the steel seizure case3 and lit-
tle with which to disagree. A competent discussion of some technical 
problems of interpreting enactments, it shows that Professor Tribe has 
1. See J. HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
2. P. 25 (emphasis added, and - a qualification I shall not repeat - end notes omitted). 
Although there are no footnotes, the 159 pages of end notes take up more than a third of the 
entire book. Many notes take up more than a half page of fine print; some as much as a page and 
a half. There are 1829 notes in all, which means that to read the notes together with the perti· 
nent text the reader must flip to the back of the book an average of seven times for every page of 
text read. What a chore it was! 
Publishers prefer end notes to footnotes because they are cheaper and enable the book to be 
produced faster. But having published two books in recent years with the publisher of Co11stitu· 
tio11a/ Choices (Harvard University Press), both with footnotes rather than end notes, I can tes· 
tify that this publisher's policy on the matter is not inflexible; and Tribe would have been well 
advised to insist on footnotes. Yet if his notes had been printed as footnotes, each page of the 
book would be (on average) less than two-thirds text and more than one-third footnotes, and the 
reader would be spending too much time interrupting his reading of the text to read footnotes -
often long and dense textual footnotes. (There would be less interruption than if the render had 
to flip to the back of the book every time he hit a note, but there would still be too much.) There 
is something more deeply wrong with Tribe's notes than their location. I shall have more to say 
about the style of the book in Part III of this review. 
3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
February-April 1986] The Constitution as Mirror 553 
"' 
lawyerly skills, as his other writings, and his success as a practitioner 
of constitutional law, also sbow. The is~ue, we shall see, is whether 
such skills are alone enough to fashion a constitutional philosophy. 
But I find much to agree with in Part I. The problem is that one 
comes out of Part I and plunges into the consideration of specific doc-
trines without knowing what Tribe's own approach is to be. The ap-
proach of not taking an approach is not illuminating. 
Part II addresses various topics in the allocation of powers within 
the federal government and between that government and state gov-
ernment. Chapter Five (the first chapter in this part) argues the un-
constitutionality of legislative proposals to withdraw the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction over types of cases offensive to the pro-
ponents - such as abortion and school prayer cases. Tribe argues 
that the proposals he discusses (some of which may have been in-
tended more as attention-getting gestures than as practical proposals) 
would circumvent the procedure for amendment set forth in the Con-
stitution and violate the provision in article III ordaining a supreme 
court. Here, as in Tribe's discussion of the justiciability of constitu-
tional amendments, the reader might think himself in the presence of a 
conventional constitutional analyst who derives modest conclusions 
from the text and structure of the Constitution. Not so; read on. 
Chapters Six and Seven attack two recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court - the Marathon 4 and Chadha 5 decisions, the first holding that 
bankruptcy judges had been given certain powers in violation of article 
III, the second that the legislative veto violated articles I and II. Tribe 
makes several good lawyerly points about these decisions, but the 
points show only that better opinions could have been written in de-
fense of the Court's results; they do not show why Tribe disagrees with 
the results. But he does, and the reason seems to be that the cases 
invalidate "political and institutional innovation[s] of the sort that 
may well be essential to the functioning of an ambitious government" 
(p. 85). The separation of powers in the Constitution was designed for 
a much smaller government, not for the welfare state; therefore the 
Constitution must be read flexibly if it is not to limit the growth of the 
federal government. Tribe does not pause to consider, however, 
whether we are better off or worse off with a big federal government -
not merely a bigger government than we had in 1787, which is inevita-
ble, but the giant government we have today - though he plainly 
thinks we are on the whole better off. Nor does he ask whether, if we 
are better off with a giant government, this might nevertheless be the 
type of good thing that requires a constitutional amendment to obtain. 
Tribe appears to believe that every good thing already is in the Consti-
4. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
5. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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tution, 6 which means, can be put there by judges "interpreting" its 
provisions. But this is assumed rather than argued. 
And here we come close to the essential weakness of Tribe's 
method. He is good at demonstrating logical flaws in judicial opin-
ions, but all that such a demonstration accomplishes is to knock out 
the opinion; it does not show that the result is wrong. Tribe writes as 
if showing that a particular decision is badly reasoned establishes that 
the opposite decision would have been correct. 
This is further illustrated in the next chapter (Chapter Eight), 
where Tribe discusses standing to sue. He casts his discussion in the 
form of a diatribe against the Lyons1 decision, where the Supreme 
Court held that the victim of a policeman's "choke hold" lacked 
standing to seek an injunction against the practice. Tribe contrasts 
Lyons with Duke Power, 8 where (he argues) the Supreme Court 
brushed aside a more serious problem of standing to sue in order to 
reach the merits and affirm the constitutionality of the limitations in 
the Price-Anderson Act on tort damages for nuclear reactor acci-
dents.9 The contrast between these decisions typifies for Tribe the dis-
honesty and class bias of today's Supreme Court, which Tribe thinks 
uses the doctrine of standing opportunistically, on the one hand to 
deny a legal remedy to a poor black man brutalized by the police and 
on the other hand to uphold a subsidy for big business. The contrast is 
overdrawn. Lyons had a remedy: damages. So would any other 
chokehold victim. The question was whether Lyons could also get an 
injunction, though it would be of very little benefit to him as he was 
unlikely to be subjected to a chokehold again. The denial of an injunc-
tion could have been upheld on the basis of standard principles of eq-
uitable relief, without reference to the constitutional doctrine of 
standing. 
In any event, the cases that Tribe has chosen to discuss are not 
representative of the Supreme Court's recent decisions on standing. 10 
6. Henry P. Monaghan effectively criticizes this position in Our Perfect Co11stitutio11, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981), as conflating politics and constitutional law. 
1: City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
8. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
9. Tribe is not alone in the view that Duke Power presented a serious problem of standing. 
See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 229 (2d ed. 
1980), which contrasts the upholding of standing in that case with the denial of standing in two 
cases where low income persons or their representatives were the plaintiffs: Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
10. To correct the balance, see Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 
947, 954-59 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. 
Commn., 461 U.S. 190, 199-203 (1983); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981); Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.6 (1978); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n.7 (1977); Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Rous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-64 (1977). Havens, in-
volving the standing of black "testers" to complain about racial discrimination even though they 
weren't in the market for housing, and Village of Arlington Heights, involving a challenge to a 
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And while making clear that he thinks the requirement of standing 
should be relaxed, Tribe does not explain why it should be relaxed, 
whether this can properly be done without amending article III, how 
far he would go in relaxing the requirement, or what the impact on the 
workload of the federal courts would be of a minimal standing doc-
trine, consistently applied. So again he scores lawyer's points but does 
not lay a foundation for his own position. 
As a critic, Tribe is open to several criticisms besides bias in the 
selection of cases to discuss. He criticizes only decisions he deems 
conservative. For example, a decision cutting back slightly on the 
minimalist doctrine of standing is criticized, but the decisions that cre-
ated that doctrine in the first place are not. It seems that if a decision 
is politically "correct," Tribe will forgive its technical shortcomings. 
Furthermore, the majority opinions of the Supreme Court are such 
large targets for technical criticisms that the sense of decency that re-
strains a sportsman from shooting fish in a barrel should restrain the 
critic from attacking the Court as fiercely as Tribe does. To secure a 
majority, a Justice must persuade four other Justices to join his opin-
ion. To do that he may have to make compromises that reduce the 
opinion's intellectual integrity. The alternative is to condemn the bar 
and the lower courts to the frustrating labor of trying to extract a 
majority position from the intersection of a plurality opinion with a 
concurring opinion(s). The Justice who opts for compromise and con-
sensus should ordinarily be forgiven the unavoidable intellectual unti-
diness of the opinion. A more important point - for my impression is 
that relatively few majority opinions in the Supreme Court are in fact 
the product of hard-fought compromise, that the spirit of compromise 
is not strong in the modem Court - the Court has so vast a jurisdic-
tion that no Justice can hope to have the same knowledge of particular 
fields of law as a professor specializing in one or two fields has. A 
judicial opinion should not read like, and should not be read like, a 
law review article. 
The next chapter of Tribe's book, Chapter Nine, deals with feder-
alism, but turns out to be narrowly focused on a few decisions, mainly 
National League of Cities v. Usery 11 (which held that the federal mini-
mum wage law could not constitutionally be applied to state govern-
ment employees), and the cases following it. On the purposes and 
proper dimensions of federalism Tribe has little to say, but given his 
enthusiasm for centralized government I was surprised to find even 
qualified approval of the doctrine of National League of Cities, whose 
zoning ordinance as being racially exclusionary, are particularly good counterexamples to Tribe's 
picture of a Supreme Court determined to manipulate the doctrine of standing to produce politi-
cally conservative outcomes. 
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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overruling12 coincided with the publication of the book. The form of 
the doctrine that he approves (or should I say, approved) is, however, 
extremely narrow: 
It may be virtually impossible to halt the erosion of state sovereignty 
caused by preemptive federal legislation, because the Supremacy Clause 
is essential to our federal system of government; national cohesion and 
national policy coherence demand it. But we surely can avoid insulting 
the states by ordering them about like so many federal bureaucratic lack-
eys when the federal constitutional rights of individuals are not at stake. 
[p. 131] 
So it comes down to avoiding "condescension" (id.), which isn't much; 
and given Tribe's broad conception of "the federal constitutional 
rights of individuals" (of which more shortly), the qualification in the 
subordinate clause ("when the constitutional rights of individuals are 
not at stake") overwhelms the assertion in the main clause. 
This chapter also criticizes - and cogently, too - the Supreme · 
Court's decisions applying the Sherman Act to local but not state gov-
ernment. Tribe argues that the internal allocation of state powers is 
no business of the federal government "when the federal constitutional 
rights of individuals are not at stake" - a vital qualification, as we 
shall see. In this area, too, the rapid evolution of legal doctrine is 
overtaking Tribe's discussion.13 
The last two chapters in Part II deal with highly specialized 
problems, growing out of Tribe's extensive consulting practice, in the 
application of constitutional doctrine to regional banking pacts and 
the issuance of bonds by American overseas possessions, respectively. 
Limitations of space move me to skip them14 and come directly to Part 
III, "The Structure of Substantive Rights." Here Tribe puts forth a 
very expansive conception of civil rights and civil liberties. 15 He 
thinks that as interpreted by the Supreme Court the Constitution is 
too protective of the status quo. He regrets for example that the Court 
has interpreted the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to 
protect only conventional property interests and not the "new prop-
erty" - such things as jobs and welfare benefits - that are so impor-
tant to ordinary people and the poor. In Chapter Thirteen, Tribe 
points out that while freedom of speech has been interpreted to protect 
the interests of people who have the money to buy advertising - and 
12. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). 
13. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985). 
14. Except to note that again events have overtaken Tribe's discussion: Northeast Bancorp, 
Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985), though not inconsistent 
with Tribe's analysis of regional banking pacts (he argued and won the case), makes the analysis 
somewhat academic. Tribe's book is perhaps too topical; it is obsolescing rapidly. 
15. A surprising omission from Tribe's discussion of civil liberties, however, is criminal pro· 
cedure, a matter on which Tribe feels strongly but which he does not discuss except for passing 
references in his discussion of the Lyons decision, and a long and rather angry end note to the 
preface. Seep. 271 n.l. 
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thus limits on campaign spending by individuals on their own behalf 
have been struck down - it has not been interpreted to protect the 
interests of those who cannot afford to put postage stamps on their 
campaign literature yet have been denied the right to deposit that liter-
ature (unstamped) in home letter boxes. Others who substitute per-
sonal time for money in the communication of ideas - labor picketers 
carrying placards - receive less protection than large corporations, 
which can take out full page ads to propagate their views. As with the 
just compensation clause, Tribe's answer to the law's tilt toward the 
status quo is not to curtail the rights of the wealthy and the established 
but to enlarge the rights of the poor and the marginal. That there 
might be a collision, since one person's right is another's duty, is not 
mentioned. 
One form of the status quo that particularly distresses Professor 
Tribe is that caused by the physical differences between men and wo-
men. The fact that women get pregnant and men don't, a fact that 
underlies a variety of traditional laws and practices, is not for Tribe a 
legitimate basis for treating men and women differently. Tribe be-
lieves that the Constitution should be interpreted to offset such bur-
dens as nature has imposed on women but not on men, even though in 
another sense, not considered by Tribe, this would mean treating men 
and women differently. If women are biologically vulnerable to partic-
ular workplace hazards, this would not for Tribe justify a law forbid-
ding them to be employed where they are exposed to the hazard; 
rather, it would mean that they are constitutionally entitled to more 
protection than men. The excessively brief chapter in which this posi-
tion is argued, Chapter Fifteen, is revealingly entitled, "Reorienting 
the Mirror of Justice: Gender, Economics, and the Illusion of the 
'Natural.' " 
The implicit theme of Part III is that the Constitution has (more 
precisely, can be given), as a principal goal, compensating for inequali-
ties in wealth and power, however caused. Thus does Tribe, although 
opposed to overarching themes of constitutional interpretation, back 
into such a theme. As a redistributivist Tribe is led to endorse the 
constitutionality of affirmative action (reverse discrimination). But he 
does so with a caveat: he admires Justice Powell's opinion in the 
Bakke case, 16 rejecting rigid quotas, which in Tribe's view are impoli-
tic and also insufficiently sensitive to people as individuals rather than 
as members of racial and other minority groups. Here and in Tribe's 
convoluted discussion of the freedom of speech of Nazis (pp. 219-20) 
one senses a slight unease with certain aspects of modem liberal 
thought. This chapter also endorses the suggestion that the propriety 
of affirmative action should depend, in part anyway, on the level of 
government that decrees it; the lower, the more suspect. So much for 
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978). 
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the principle that the internal allocation of functions in state govern-
ment is not of federal constitutional concern. 
The last chapter of Part III challenges the fundamental distinction 
in constitutional law between the public and private spheres. In gen-
eral the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties. It requires gov-
ernment to leave people alone in certain respects but does not tell it to 
provide services, correct private wrongs, or bring about a more just 
distribution of the world's goods. The due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment, for example, limit only 
"state action," not private action. Tribe will not abide the distinction; 
it seems to him to ignore "the state's complicity in" "the patterns of 
social and economic domination that permeate and in part define our 
society" (p. 265). This is strong language. Consider its application to 
the Irvis case, 17 where the Supreme Court held that the equal protec-
tion clause did not forbid a private club to discriminate against black 
people, merely because the state had given the club a license to sell 
liquor. Tribe thinks that the plaintiff should have sued the liquor con-
trol board rather than the club, so that "he could have directly 
charged the board members with suborning racism and aggravating its 
impact. by handing out the privilege of a scarce liquor license without 
regard to the licensee's racist practices" (p. 255). If licensing the sale 
of liquor, as distinct from allowing liquor to be sold without a license, 
increased the likelihood of racial discrimination by private clubs, Tribe 
would have a point. Maybe some types of regulation do· increase the 
likelihood of discrimination, and maybe the idea of state action could 
be enlarged to embrace discrimination by firms so regulated. 18 But 
Tribe makes no argument along these lines. 19 His position seems to be 
that state agencies that have the power to combat racial discrimination 
by private persons should not be allowed to take a neutral stance. 
They must use their power to forbid those persons to discriminate; the 
Constitution imposes an overriding duty on all public officials with an 
axe to wield it in such a way as will advance egalitarian ideals. The 
reductio ad absurd um of this view is that a minister or rabbi unwilling 
to perform mixed marriages should not be licensed to perform any 
marriages. _ 
If one combines Tribe's view that the Constitution requires govern-
ment to eliminate natural inequalities with his assault on the "public-
private" distinction, one has a recipe for rampant judicial activism. 
Yet how far he would actually push the logic of his position is unclear. 
The chapter on state action is the least coherent in the book. To the 
17. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
18. See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 355-58 (1981). 
19. In his treatise on constitutional law he suggests that Irvis might have found it easier to 
obtain liquor in nondiscriminatory surroundings ifliquor were unlicensed. See L. TRIBE, AMER· 
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1173 (1978). No basis for this suggestion is offered. 
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radical notion that private prejudice is typically a product of state ac-
tion ("complicity") - that there is little or no bigotry in the state of 
nature - Tribe juxtaposes an imaginatively limited reading of Shelley 
v. Kraemer, 20 where the Supreme Court held that a state's judicial en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants violated the equal protec-
tion clause. Tribe says that the state refused to enforce most 
restrictive covenants, deeming them impermissible restraints on alien-
ation; the decision to enforce racial covenants was thus a decision to 
use state power to promote racial segregation. Since the state was 
Missouri and the time the 1940s, this is a realistic analysis. But in the 
name of "complicity," Tribe apparently is willing to find unconstitu-
tional state involvement in private discrimination where (as in Irvis) 
others would find a policy neutral in purpose and effect: a policy not 
adopted in order to promote discrimination and unlikely to make it 
greater than it otherwise would be. 
II 
In developing a rationale for.Shelley v. Kraemer, and in his criti-
cisms of specific cases, not all of which I have mentioned,21 Tribe's 
book makes a worthwhile contribution to the literature of constitu-
tional law. But the book aspires to be more than a series of individual 
case readings. The fulsome senatorial encomia that decorate the dust 
jacket are not likely to have been bestowed as compliments for Profes-
sor Tribe's legal analytic powers or individual case readings, but are 
more likely to reflect his political slant. In his view (one widely shared 
by constitutional scholars at all points of the political compass) every 
good thing can be found somewhere in the Constitution; and most of 
the good things happen also to be advocated by politicians supported 
by Tribe. As Tribe conceives constitutional "interpretation," the Con-
stitution is flexible enough to embrace - to command - a partisan 
political position. The most important question about his book is 
whether this view is tenable. 
I think not; and in fact the view is barely defended, in the book or 
anywhere else, which is a clue to its indefensibility. The book is over-
whelmingly negative. It attacks; it does not defend. We learn what 
are not legitimate sources of constitutional meaning. Text is not. 
Constitutional Choices contains few quotations from the Constitution, 
an omission that obscures the distance between the actual words of the 
document and the meaning Tribe would impress on it. History, 
20. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This reading is foreshadowed in Tribe's treatise. See L. TRIBE, supra 
note 19, at 1023. This is true of some other discussions in Constitutional Choices - compare for 
example the discussion of the steel seizure case in American Constitutional Law at 181-82 with 
the discussion of the same· case in Constitutional Choices at 32-33. For the most part, however, 
Constitutional Choices is not a rehash of the earlier book. 
21. There is a particularly good discussion ofFERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See 
pp. 125-32. 
560 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:551 
whether in the broad or the narrow ("legislative history") sense, is not 
a proper source of constitutional meaning either, for Tribe. He has 
virtually nothing to say about history; history might have begun in the 
year of Earl Warren's appointment as Chief Justice (the implicit view 
of many law students). Therefore the values and intentions of the 
framers of the Constitution and its amendments are not significant 
sources of constitutional meaning for Tribe. Precedents mean little to 
him, too, unless they come from or anticipate the era of expansive 
constitutional interpretations that crested between the replacement of 
Felix Frankfurter by Arthur Goldberg on the Supreme Court in 1962 
and the appointment of Warren Burger in 1969. Any deviation from 
the "line" laid down in this era, the heyday of the "Warren Court," 
Tribe deprecates; the line itself he swallows along with hook and 
sinker. 
Tribe is also against "formalism," the idea that legal outcomes can 
be derived by logical deduction from premises external to the judge's 
own values and experience. He considers it a technique for concealing 
the true grounds of decision in difficult cases. He is also, as we have 
seen, against all overarching schemes of constitutional interpretation. 
And he is against "technocratic" reasoning,22 typified by the cost-ben-
efit approach of the economic analysts of law but apparently encom-
passing all instrumental reasoning. Thus he disagrees that the goal of 
legal procedure should be to minimize the sum of the error costs and 
avoidance-of-error costs of applying legal sanctions, or even that accu-
racy should be the overriding goal. He writes, "procedural fairness 
reflects the intrinsic value of assuring fair treatment as an individual 
and not simply the instrumental value of assuring correct outcomes" 
(p. 227; emphasis added). In other words, fairness means being fair. 
This is not quite so empty a view as it sounds; if it were, we would 
approve of lynching, provided it was clear that the victim of the lynch-
ing would have been convicted and executed if spared for trial, and we 
don't approve of it. But whether there is as much to the view as Tribe 
thinks may be doubted; I shall come back to this point. 
There are things that are appealing in Tribe's litany of negations. 
Distinguished Supreme Court Justices as otherwise different as John 
Marshall and Oliver Wendell Holmes have also believed that the Con-
stitution should, in many of its provisions anyway, be interpreted flexi-
bly, as a document - with the amendments, really a series of 
documents - intended to be adaptable to an unforeseeable future. 
This view limits (but does not eliminate) the role of text, history, and 
22. But not consistently against it. See p. 147 ("Only when the costs may be externalized, 
and the benefits internalized, does the Commerce Clause clearly disapprove of self-interested 
moves on the part of a state.") Incidentally, the dust jacket and preface describe the book as an 
attack on cost-benefit thinking, see p. viii, but in fact this theme rarely appears. But see p. 271 
n.l. 
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precedent, and makes formalism an unworkable judicial philosophy.23 
I even agree with Professor Tribe that the Constitution is not a general 
mandate for economic efficiency, though many of its provisions can be 
illuminated by economic analysis - among them the commerce 
clause, where, it seems to me, Tribe gets into trouble by refusing to 
think economically. I shall give just. one example. The judge-made 
"market participant" doctrine allows a state engaged in market activi-
ties, such as selling cement from a state-owned cement plant, to im-
pose restrictions on itself that would violate the commerce clause if 
imposed on private sellers. Tribe defends this result by reference to 
the distinction between "creating commerce that would otherwise not 
exist" and "merely intruding into a previously existing private mar-
ket" (p. 146; emphasis in original - as a matter of fact twenty-four 
words on this page are italicized for emphasis). But before the state 
had a cement plant, there was a market for cement; otherwise the state 
would not have built or acquired the plant. By owning such a plant, 
the state reduces the private supply of cement; it substitutes a public 
for a private market participant. The restrictions it imposes on itself 
(e.g., refusing to buy inputs from out of state) are therefore equivalent 
to restrictions imposed on the same amount of private supply by a 
state that does not participate in the market. 
Having stripped away the usual aids to constitutional interpreta-
tion, and lacking a taste for political philosophy, Tribe is left with a set 
of unexamined political premises to guide the formation of constitu-
tional doctrine. They are not only unexamined; despite Tribe's con-
tempt for judges who (he believes) conceal their class bias and 
conservative politics behind a formalist facade, the political character 
of his own premises is not acknowledged. He deflects the reader's at-
tention from this omission by making the Supreme Court's decisions 
of the 1960s the baseline for normative judgments (without explaining 
why) and then criticizing later decisions as reactionary deviations.24 
He criticizes them as illogical and not just politically repulsive devia-
tions, but that angle of attack, as I have suggested, is superficial; to 
show that a decision is poorly reasoned does not establish that the 
opposite decision would be correct. Many of the decisions he admires 
23. Unless (perhaps) a majority of Supreme Court Justices happen to come from identical 
backgrounds, both personal and professional. If so, their shared values might provide an ade-
quate set of common premises from which to deduce the outcomes in otherwise indeterminate 
cases, and the reign of logic would be preserved. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal TheorJJ, 
in OXFORD EsSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 95 (2d ser. A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973), makes a 
similar argument in discussing the cohesiveness of the English common law. But like other 
American judges, Supreme Court Justices come from diverse personal and professional 
backgrounds. 
24. A good example is his use, in Chapter Eight, ofFlast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), as the 
baseline for attacking recent decisions on standing to sue. Had Tribe used as his baseline Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), which announced the approach to standing that was 
repudiated in Flast over a forceful dissent by Justice Harlan, many of those recent decisions -
though, admittedly, not Duke Power - would not seem deviant. See notes 9-10 supra. 
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were poorly reasoned too. At bottom Tribe is expressing disagreement 
with the politics of the current Supreme Court - and distorting those 
politics. If Tribe had taken as his baseline the Supreme Court of the 
1940s or 1950s - both periods in which the Court's average quality 
was as high as at any time since - he would have to regard both the 
Earl Warren and the Warren Burger eras as "liberal" deviations. To 
think the contemporary Supreme Court a "reactionary" court is to 
betray a lack of perspective, as well as to ignore much scholarship to 
the contrary.25 
Tribe might answer that the difference between the Warren and 
Burger eras that he perceives is not a difference in political orientation 
in a narrow partisan sense but a difference in fundamental values. The 
Warren Court (Tribe might say) wanted to create a freer, more equal 
society; the Burger Court wants to preserve social arrangements that 
are unjust, unfree, and unequal. If this were the choice, it would be an 
easy one to make. But in adumbrating his "vision of what this country 
is about" (p. 357 n.246), Tribe forgets that he is taking sides on burn-
ing issues, rather than uttering truisms. Diametrically opposed to the 
"liberal" ideology espoused by Tribe is an equally articulate "con-
servative" ideology with as good a philosophical pedigree as the "lib-
eral"26 and a better historical one from a constitutional standpoint 
because it is more in keeping with the values of 1787, 1789, and 1868. 
The adherents to this ideology would (improperly in my view) reorient 
constitutional law to make it a mandate for economic liberty and a 
nemesis of the welfare state.27 Preoccupied with the modest retrench-
ments of the Burger Court - ignoring its bold initiatives in abortion, 
free speech, and other areas - Tribe overlooks the greater potential 
menace to all he holds dear in constitutional analysis that comes from 
a point of the political compass far to the right of the current Supreme 
Court, and that derives legitimacy from a position, such as Tribe's, 
which empties the Constitution of meaning. 
Tribe's neglect of all but a narrow segment of political and social 
thinking on the issues that he discusses undermines his book at ma~y 
points. For example, his position that due process (in the sense of 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing) is an unqualified good to be 
pursued without regard to costs is made unpersuasive by his refusal to 
consider the extensive literature, most of it neither economic nor con-
25. See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Blasi ed. 
1983); Gunther, Reflections on the Burger Court, STAN. LAW., Spring 1985, at 5. 
26. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
27. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); Conant, 
Antimonopo/y Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases 
Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785 (1982); Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract 
Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984); Economic Liberties and the Judiciary, 4 CATO J., 661 
(1985). There are ns well a variety of other conservative positions, none of which Tribe discusses. 
I mention only the most dramatic contrast to his position. 
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servative, that emphasizes the adverse impact on the very people in-
tended to be benefited by the procedural safeguards that Tribe would 
see extended -juveniles, the disabled, people on welfare.28 He also 
does not consider whether the poor would actually gain froin an inter-
pretation of the just compensation clause that made welfare a form of 
property, given that such an interpretation would make government 
reluctant to raise welfare levels, since once raised they could not be 
lowered. And he seems unacquainted with the literature on the actual 
consequences - inany of them perverse - of welfare rights which he 
would constitutionalize. 29 His discussion of policy is, in a word, super-
ficial - a serious weakness in a book that equates constitutional law 
with sound social policy. 
Tribes treatment of labor picketing, in the chapter on freedom of 
speech (pp. 198-203), provides a further illustration of this point. He 
considers the application to picketing of the principle that the first 
amendment permits the regulation ·of "speech brigaded with action" 
an example of the Supreme Court's class-conscious hostility to inex-
pensive modes of communicating ideas, for he can find no distinction 
between picketing and advertising except that the latter costs more. 
He ignores the fact that unions are allowed to and do make substantial 
political contributions, 30 and the fact that picketing is potentially coer-
cive in ways that advertising is not. Even those most friendly to the 
union movement, and most hostile to the judicial position on picket-
ing, recognize that picketers are sometimes violent (which means, 
often potentially violent) and that picketing enables the identification 
of replacement workers and other strikebreakers for future retalia-
tion.31 These are not properties of advertising. It is true that some 
people regard advertising as "coercive" in subtler ways, but the same 
people are likely to complain - with justification, too - about the 
loose use of the word "coercion" in discussions of purely peaceful, 
nonretaliatory picketing.32 It is also true that labor picketing is a lot 
more peaceful than it once was; but it could become less peaceful again 
28. See, e.g., 2 K. DA VIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LA w TREATISE 495-99 (2d ed. 1979); W. GELL-
HORN, C, BYSE & p. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 445-51 (7th ed. 
1979); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM: CASES AND COMMENTS 192-94 (2d ed. 1985); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing'~ 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275-77, 1289-91, 1303-04, 1316-17 (1975); Fuerst & Petty, Due Process-
How Much is Enough?, 79 PUB. INTEREST 96 (1985); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due 
Process, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974). 
29. See, e.g., M. ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 43-58 (1978); B. PAGE, WHO GETS WHAT FROM GOVERNMENT 60-100 
(1983) - the former written from a conservative, the latter from a liberal, standpoint. 
30. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972). 
31. See, e.g., Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1469, 1491 (1982). 
32. See, e.g., Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 
1023 (1953). 
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if it were wholly free from regulation, as Professor Tribe thinks the 
first amendment requires that it be. 
There is a more fundamental point. The purpose of labor picket-
ing generally is to increase wages, or economic equivalents such as 
fringe benefits. Picketing thus resembles concerted activity by compa-
nies to raise prices (or depress wages).33 Yet even in an era when com-
mercial speech is constitutionally protected, no one thinks the 
government cannot forbid cartels just because their members commu-
nicate information and opinions on prices and other matters of mutual 
concern, either with each other or (to make the analogy to picketing 
closer) with consumers, suppliers, and competitors. It is not obvious 
that wage-fixing should have a different status under the first amend-
ment from price-fixing. This is another issue that Professor Tribe 
ignores. 
His suggestions that the recent decline in the percentage of Ameri-
can workers belonging to unions is due to corporations' spending more 
than unions on propaganda (p. 202), and that American unions' tradi-
tional lack of interest in ideology "has been shaped in large degree by 
the Supreme Court itself" (pp. 202-03), are unsupported and implausi-
ble. And his failure to mention the severe restrictions that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has imposed, and the Supreme Court 
has upheld, on employers' freedom of speech34 leaves the reader in the 
dark about Tribe's view of what the first amendment should mean in 
the labor field. It also illustrates Tribe's selective use of legal doctrine 
to support his thesis about the political character of the current 
Supreme Court. By avoiding mention of the Supreme Court's refusal, 
in the teeth of the statute, 35 to give employers the same rights of free 
speech that the Court has given the Communist Party, Tribe avoids 
having to confront a conspicuous contradiction of his thesis that the 
Court is a right-wing institution. 
III 
Tribe's policy choices seem based on will and emotion rather than 
evidence and logic. Maybe this is true for everyone, but not everyone 
is so eager to impose his choices on the community. Further evidence 
of the emotional and egoistic character of Tribe's constitutionalism is 
the book's overripe, immodest, and opaque style. Here is one exam-
ple: "If I succeed in evaporating a cloud here or a mist there and, thus, 
in displaying more lucidly a broader span of the constitutional horizon 
33. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 988 (1984). 
34. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), and for criticism Getman, Labor 
Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 Mo. L. REV. 4 (1984). 
35. See section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c); 
NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 926-28 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.). 
February-April 1986] The Constitution as Mirror 565 
and its curvature, this volume will have achieved most of what I hoped 
to accomplish by writing it" (p. x). Here is another: 
Publishing these essays in the meantime [pending revision of his 1978 
treatise on constitutional law, wh~ch he describes as "a more global ef-
fort: it was an attempt to roll the constitutional universe into a ball and 
show it as a unified whole"], rather than reducing and polishing them 
into pieces of that more comprehensive later work, has been a liberation 
for me. I would not wish to squirrel the essays away until they can be 
folded into a larger study, one in which they fit elegantly but no longer 
reflect my freshest thoughts on the issues they seek to treat. I would 
rather publish them now - rough edges only partly trimmed and links 
only tentatively forged:-- in the season of their completion. [p. x]. 
This is awfully plummy prose ("season of completion," etc.), written 
by someone who takes himself awfully seriously; and it does not make 
much sense, either. Since many of the essays published in this book 
had been published previously in law reviews or elsewhere, the choice 
was not between collecting them in a book and "squirrel[ing] them 
away." And why should a reader want Professor Tribe's "freshest" 
thoughts, unmatured by reflection? Do they stale so quickly? 
Several other characteristics of Tribe's style also deserve attention 
for the light they cast on his method of constitutional argument: 
1. Excessive use of italics is one. I mentioned a page on which 
twenty-four words are italicized for emphasis;36 on another page I 
counted twenty-five (p. 43). Here is one sentence from a different 
page: 
In short, remembering that it is an amendment to the Constitution we 
are considering may be almost as important as remembering that it is a 
Constitution we are, in the end, amending and construing - and remem-
bering that, because neither process may be emptied of substance or sub-
jectivity, both must engage the judiciary in a more candid and 
collaborative way than the pretense of proceduralism permits. [p. 28] 
Notice, besides the italics, the excessive alliteration ("substance or sub-
jectivity," "candid and collaborative," "pretense of proceduralism per-
mits"), the filler words ("almost," "in the end"), the apparent lack of a 
verb to go with the third "remembering that," which makes the sen-
tence collapse - and the incongruous "In short" which introduces the 
sentence. 
2. Professor Tribe's writing is plethoric. In the following sentence 
I have bracketed the words that could be eliminated without loss of 
meaning: 
At stake in [any] such response - particularly if it becomes a [more or 
less] common reaction to constitutional rulings that [seriously] displease 
a [popular] majority that finds itself not quite able to overturn them by 
amendment - is [nothing less than] the survival of a distinctly Ameri-
36. See text following note 23 supra. 
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can institution, that of review of legislative and executive action by an 
independent judiciary [entrusted to enforce the Constitution]. [p. 48] 
Take away the superfluous words and you will realize how little is 
being said. Notice also the use of "distinctly" where Tribe means 
"distinctively.'_'37 
3. Tribe is too fond of metaphor, as in "disarmed, disembodied 
oracle" (p. 53), "increasingly slender reed" (p. 358 n.250), and the 
"mythical" [was there, as Herodotus thought, a real?] "Sword of 
Damocles" that, all on one page (p. 49), hangs, is tested, then falls -
then, in most un-Damoclean fashion, is fallen on - and the author 
wonders whether the Supreme Court would "take the blow lying 
down." He makes metaphor a substitute for analysis, as when he says 
of the anti-abortionists that they would "conscript women . . . as in-
voluntary incubators" (p. 243), "foster involuntary servitude" (p. 
244), and make women "donate their bodies to their unborn children" 
(id.). These are arresting (if derivative38) ways of characterizing the 
anti-abortionists' position, but they create a rhetoric of emotion rather 
than of meaning. Does Tribe really take these metaphors seriously? 
Consider the "incubator" metaphor. An incubator does not contrib-
ute anything to the genetic makeup of the baby. It is thus an impover-
ished metaphor fo! a mother. Tribe gives no evidence of being willing 
actually to think about the abortion controversy. 
4. Legal and academic jargon, "with-it" cliches, and dense 
nominalizations give the book an air that Tribe might if more self-
aware have called "technocratic," as in "delineate the perimeter which 
circumscribes" (p. 123 - meaning, "describe"), "manipulable bom-
again Contract Clause analysis" (p. 182), "mechanical gender-based 
classifications" (p. 224), 39 "suitably sequenced combination of two dif-
ferent lenses" (p. 248), "Close-Focus Lense: Looking for a Nexus" (p. 
249). The last phrase is a subtitle. The titles and subtitles are awful. 
37. Other, less serious because more common, solecisms are the "hoi polloi," p. 186, and 
"schizophrenic," p. 195. "Hoi" is the Greek masculine plural nominative article, "the"; "the hoi 
polloi," the form used by Tribe, means "the the many." "Schizophrenia" is psychosis; it is not 
the condition in which one has trouble making up one's mind or acts inconsistently - the latter 
being Tribe's meaning. Of course this is a very common mistake; I'm sure I have made it. But 
he underscores it by saying, "The response of the Court may be described, without exaggeration, 
as schizophrenic." "[W]ithout exaggeration" is, to anyone who knows what "schizophrenia" 
really means, a comical exaggeration. 
38. See, e.g., Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). 
39. The use of "gender" for "sex,'' and the addition of a superfluous "-based" to words like 
"gender" and (in first amendment law) "content,'' are among the uglier bits of contemporary 
legal jargon. One might expect academics, at least, to eschew them. One might also expect 
academics to avoid false antitheses ("For a doctrine in its infancy, commercial speech has 
demonstrated remarkable vigor,'' p. 211 - as if infants typically lacked vigor), as well as such 
gobbledygook as: "In short, the Court indulged in a shell game, first throwing out a circular 
definition of the limited public forum, then trying to break the circle by noting the acceptability 
of subject-matter restrictions, and, finally, proceeding to apply minimal scrutiny to alleged view-
point discrimination,'' p. 207. 
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These faults of style may be accidents of haste or carelessness, 40 
but they are not unrelated to the book's substance. They pad and be-
dazzle, and if one stripped them away one would lay bare a slim and 
unimpressive substance, the literary counterpart to a shaven Persian 
cat. Also, a writer's style indicates, if not always the quality of his (or 
her) thought, always the character of his culture. Despite Tribe's an-
tagonism to "technocracy," he himself is not, on the evidence of this 
book anyway, a person steeped in the humanities. This would not be 
important if he did not present himself to the reader as a defender of 
traditional culture against economists and other "technocrats," or if 
he did not claim to be expounding a new constitutional philosophy. It 
is his ambition to shape and direct constitutional thinking along new 
paths that draws the reader's attention to the poverty of his style and 
to the fact that those 1829 end notes contain few references to the 
world of thought that exists outside of recent Supreme Court opinions 
(many drafted by twenty-five-year-old law clerks fresh out of law 
school) and the professional commentary on them. 
So, to complete the list of the things that this book is not, it is not a 
book by someone who brings to the study of law a perspective beyond 
that of the intelligent legal practitioner equipped only with the law-
yer's technical skills. I do not mean to denigrate those skills, which 
are essential to constitutional reasoning and enable Tribe to offer some 
shrewd analyses of individual cases. Only they do not, standing all by 
themselves, enable him, or anyone, to construct a system of constitu-
tional law. A person who knows only what is in cases is not equipped 
to make fundamental social choices for us. If Tribe knew more, he 
would be less confident that he could make such choices correctly. 
Activism begins in ignorance. 
And yet Professor Tribe is, if perhaps not as the dust jacket says 
the nation's leading scholar and practitioner of constitutional law, cer-
tainly a prominent one. The failure of the book is a failure not of a 
person but of a method; and the method is to use the skills of a lawyer 
to make political choices for society in the name of a fictive constitu-
tion, as if the Supreme Court really were a superlegislature and gov-
ernment by lawyers had, at last, arrived.41 The failure is a particularly 
striking one because Tribe disparages the tradition of legal analysis at 
the same time that he wields its tools. He faults the Supreme Court 
for illogic and uncandor, often effectively, yet at the same time sug-
40. Tribe's constitutional law treatise, supra note 19, is much better written· than Constitu-
tional Choices. On the relationship of bad writing to bad thinking see, e.g., George Orwell's 
classic essay Politics and the English Language (widely reprinted); S. CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF 
WORDS (1938); G. KRESS & R. HODGE, LANGUAGE AS IDEOLOGY (1979). 
41. See Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook's recent reply to an article by Tribe: Easter-
brook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 627-29 (1985), criticiz-
ing Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 
(1985). 
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gests that the test of constitutional doctrine is not its craftsmanship 
but its political soundness - that the question is not how good a court 
the Supreme Court is but how good a legislature. 
He does not defend this view, so I shall not bother to attack it 
beyond remarking that although it is inevitable that judges will have 
political views, it is not inevitable that judges will use them to thwart 
the political decisions of the elected branches of government. Judging 
and legislating were not meant to be identical. The failure to appreci-
ate this rather elementary point is the fatal, though not the only, flaw 
of this book. 
The Supreme Court is a committee of lawyers, appointed for life, 
who are on average no wiser or humbler than Professor Tribe, except 
insofar as age and institutional responsibility create wisdom and 
humility in some. For the sake of social peace and stability, let us 
hope that the Court, whatever the politics of its members, will always 
hesitate more than the author of Constitutional Choices hesitates to 
translate personal political preferences into constitutional imperatives. 
